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 Institutionalized Social Technologies Index 
 
This paper presents an index of institutionalized social technologies covering its two main 
dimensions namely Risk reducing technologies and Anti Rent seeking technologies and in turn covers 
several social, institutional, political and economic aspects. Specifically it attempted to classify and 
measure various types of institutions based on a theoretical framework, these institutional indicators are 
then aggregated to measure cross country institutional qualities of 141 countries. We also test provide a 
comparison with other major indices. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite of the fact the role of institutions in shaping economic history has given significant 
importance but the empirical literature is not matching in social sciences 
1
.  The institutions are 
defined as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, ―the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction‖. These rules of the game can be in the form of formal institutions 
like laws and regulations or informal ones which assimilated to culture or social capital 
(Tabellini 2005, Putnam 1993). Some institutions lowers transaction cost thereby result in 
innovation and productivity whereas other institutional features impedes information flow, 
raising information costs and eroding the gains from information, and  limits the entrepreneurial 
activity. Examples of the institutions that stunt economic growth include government, police, 
court corruption, excessive taxation and regulation, unstable inconsistent monetary and fiscal 
policy. (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Johnson, McMillan, Woodruff, 1999, 2000; Gwartney, 
Holcombe and Lawson, 1998, 1999; Johnson, Kaufmann, Zoido-Lobaton, 1998; Shleifer and 
Vishney, 1993, 1994; Soto, 1989, 2000).  
 
                                                          
1 For detail survey of varied meanings of institutions in political science, see Hall and Taylor (1994) or Powell and 
DiMaggio (1991) for sociological perspective. 
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North(1990, p.54) asserts that ―The inability of societies to develop effective, low cost 
enforcement of contracts is the most important source of historical stagnation and contemporary 
underdevelopment in the third world‖. Neoclassical growth modelling Solow (1956) predicted 
economies move toward their steady-state growth path which means that in the long run, income 
per capita levels will converge. However, lack of empirical support for convergence has 
presented a major challenge to these models. A more refined endogenous growth theory by 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) and its empirics provides the evidence of  ‗conditional‘‘ 
convergence, where convergence is conditional on factors some of which are related to 
institutions. This is explained by new growth theories as ―knowledge spillovers‖ assumption 
whereby any sector in less advanced countries can catch-up with the current technological 
frontier whenever it ―innovates‖.  The innovation also refers to the adaptation of technologies 
which in turn depends upon the institutional arrangements.  
The literature on the relationship between economic performance and the quality of domestic 
institutions shows better the quality of domestic institutions the higher the effects on the Human 
development and growth of a country. Institutional quality is measured in empirical literature 
utilizing data bases provides by various commercial (PRS and BERI), or non-commercial (WEF; 
Global Integrity; Bertelsmann; POLITY PROJECT and World bank) organizations. In particular 
the efforts like (Kaufmann at al 2008 ; Gwartney and Lawson 2008 ; Miller and Holmes 2009)  
as well as most of the above mentioned databases are to make the aggregate various institutional 
measures to form some meaningful estimates of institutional quality across nations. World bank 
study focuses on institutions promoting regulating and bureaucratic efficiencies in terms of 
starting a business, whereas POLITY focuses on the role of political institutions. Global Integrity 
captures institutions pertaining to regulatory efficiency and accountability. Perhaps the most 
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comprehensive study by Kaufmann at al. (2008) attempted to cover a wide range of institutions- 
which they called governance indicators – categorizing institutions in six indicators. Few 
attempted to provide an aggregate picture, but this aggregation is based on the institutions‘ 
relative importance in economic performance as their authors‘ sees it, this clearly lacks proper 
theoretical bases. In this study we tried to aggregate indices to judge cross country institutional 
quality in a theoretical framework.   
We take our queue from theoretical framework set by Douglass North (1981, pp. 20-27) that 
explain the roles of institutions,  proposes two theories, a ―Contract theory‖ of the state and a 
―Predatory theory‖ of the state. According to the first theory, the state and associated institutions 
provide the legal framework that enables private contracts to facilitate economic transactions 
hence reducing transaction costs. According to the second, the state is an instrument for 
transferring resources from one group to another. North (1981) emphasised that good institutions 
will simultaneously support private contracts and provide checks against expropriation by the 
government or other politically powerful groups. However, like (North (1981)), the 
contemporary literature has not attempted to determine the relative roles of institutions 
supporting private contracts and institutions constraining government and elite expropriation. 
In this study, we attempted to explore these roles through the notion of institutionalized social                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
technologies. The term ―social technologies‖ involve patterned human interaction rather than 
physical engineering, also has been put forth by (North and Wallis 1994; Boserup 1996  and Day 
and Walter 1987).  Nelson and Sampat (2001)  proposed, not all social technologies are 
institutions, but rather only those that have become a standard and expected thing to do, given 
the objectives and the setting. Institutionalized social technologies define low transaction cost 
ways of doing things that involve human interaction. Hence effectively institutionalized social 
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technologies, individuals capture the social returns to their actions as private returns  It protects 
the output of individual productive units from diversion and also resolves the problem of 
asymmetric information as it develop mutual trust among agents. Whereas ineffective 
institutionalized social technology will not only increase the risk but also divert economic agents 
from innovative activities to seeking rents.  
Our index of institutionalized social technologies is made up of Risk reducing technologies and 
Anti Rent seeking technologies. Risk reducing technology – Contract theory as put forth by 
North (1981), removes information asymmetry, creates mutual trust and hence decreases the risk 
of creating long term business relationships. It contains institutional arrangement pertaining to 
contract enforcement, property rights, justice system, Law enforcement and policy stability. 
Whereas Anti Rent seeking technologies - Predatory theory in the words of North (1981),  plugs 
in predatory opportunities that arises due to gaps in institutions creating rents for controlling 
agents betting them higher return than through innovation hence making society moves from 
innovative to rent seeking activities. Our index contains institutions that deal in the areas of 
bureaucratic efficiency, ease of doing business, corruption, and competition. Hence this paper 
aims to captures nations‘ institutional performance through wide range of institutional variables 
by combining these variables in an index according to a theoretical framework on how these 
variables effect growth and productivity. In this way the present study combines North‘s contract 
and predatory theory with the notion of social technologies. 
Paper is organized as follows section1 introduction, section 2 covers review of literature, section 
3 covers methodology and rational for index components,  section 4 exhibits the indices and 
comparison with others, and the last section gives conclusions and recommendations. 
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2. Review of Literature 
The Contract theory literature, starting with Coase (1937, 1960) and Williamson (1975, 1985), 
links the efficiency of organizations and societies to what type of contracts can be written and 
enforced, and thus underscores the importance of contracting institutions (see also Grossman and 
Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; and Hart 1995). In contrast, other authors advocating predatory 
theory, emphasize the importance of private property rights, especially their protection against 
expropriation (see, among others, Jones, 1981; De Long and Shleifer, 1993, or Olson 2000). 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), attempt to distinguish between ―predatory‖ institutions and 
―contracting‖ institutions. Here they find strong support for predatory institutions on current 
economic outcome but in contrast, the role of contracting institutions is more limited.  
 Concept of institutions as social technologies is consonant with the notion that institutions are 
―the rules of the game‖.  Nelson and Sampat (2001) proposed that particular social technologies 
become institutionalized through different mechanisms and are sustained through different 
structures.  Pelikan (2003), Institutionalized social technology are those rule 
routines(technology) that are imposed by society or government  through laws, norms, 
expectations, governing structures and mechanisms, customary modes of transacting and 
interacting,  and converted into rule constraints.  
 Nelson (2007) point out ―Societies clearly have a degree of control over institutions like the 
formal structure of laws, and formal organizational designs and designated authority 
relationships‖.  Baumol (1990) pointed out information asymmetry through rent seeking or 
organized crime is curbed through strong institutions--so only venue left for competition and 
dominance is through innovation. Hence in the setting of effective enforcement, these 
asymmetries will lead to innovation as  the only venue left to earn information rents.  
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First component in our index of institutional technologies is Risk reducing technologies. 
Increased risk divert resources from productive activities to protecting there rights.  Hall & Jones 
(1999) showed quantitatively, how important these effects are. Productive activities are 
vulnerable to predation. As they put it, Social control of diversion has two benefits. First, in a 
society free of diversion, productive units are rewarded by the full amount of their production, 
and where there is diversion, on the other hand, it acts like a tax on output. Second, where social 
control of diversion is effective, individual units do not need to invest resources in avoiding 
diversion. In many cases, social control is much cheaper than private avoidance. Social control 
act as a threat of punishment, which itself is free and the only resources required are those 
needed to make this threat credible. In other word social control does not means collectively 
hiring guards by society proves to be cheaper. Magee, Brock and Young (1989) and Murphy 
Shleifer and Vishny (1991) explain how inadequate controls affect growth.  
Our index of risk reducing technologies covers the institutions pertaining to property rights, law 
and order, and policy stability. Among all these, property rights and contract enforcement is one 
of the most elaborated topics in institutional literature. Few studies are touched here. Cozzi 
(2001) shows that better institutional quality – in the form of a tighter patent protection – 
increases both growth rate and inequality.  The law and finance literature, pioneered by La Porta 
et al. (1997,1998), argues that institutions – property rights honouring government, investor and 
creditor rights, and efficient judicial enforcement – are critical to capital market development. 
Gould and Gruben (1996) and Kanwar and Evenson (2001) document a positive relation between 
property rights and growth or innovation.  The two most important ―core‖ institutions for 
encouraging entrepreneurship are well-defined property rights and the rule of law. It is well 
established that those countries where these core institutions are developed have a record of 
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strong economic growth (Boettke & Subrick 2002; Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson, 1998, 
1999; Scully, 1988). 
One of the most important institutional arrangement in security of property rights and contract 
enforcement are proper judicial system.  If the courts are slow, inefficient, then corrupt informal 
contract enforcement appears as a solution to court failures (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 
2002; Macaulay 1963; Galanter 1981 and Ellickson 1991). 
Another important measure of risk reducing technologies is policy stability which is linked with 
political stability. ( Olson(1993;  Londregan and Poole 1990) have shown that political violence 
affects the  economic performance  Alesina,Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1992) shows the 
political instability leads to slower growth.  
Second and perhaps more important measure of institutional quality is index of anti-rent seeking 
technologies. As shown earlier, the rent-seeking (behaviour) refers to ―the socially costly pursuit 
of wealth transfers‖ (Tollison, 1997). In other words, rent-seeking is manifested when the 
bottom-line of its social consequences is negative. 
Mehlum et al.(2003) explains the notion of destructive creations asserts that it all starts from the 
breakdown of institutions, generating new opportunities of extracting rents without producing. A 
vast literature can be found linking entrepreneurship, rent seeking and growth (Murphy, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1991; Baumol, 1990, 1993; Acemoglu, 1995;  Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998 ). 
Rents can be divided into the institutional rents, which cover institutions related to regulatory 
quality, corruption, and ease of doing business. There is a dearth of literature linking regulatory 
quality and growth, most of them proves a point that excessive laws and regulations are the more 
general problem.  Djankov et al. (2002) document the number of regulatory hurdles on the path 
to establishing a small business in 85 countries. The empirical analyses prove that bad 
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bureaucratic quality harms both the growth performance and productivity of both developed and 
developing countries (Lamsdorff 2004; Sarte 2001; Chong and Calderon 2000 ;  Grigorian and 
Martinez 2001  and Rodrik 1997). 
Corruption is yet another form of rent seeking which can be dealt by proper institutional 
framework. Vast number of studies done on this topic.  Gupta et al. (2001) find that countries 
with high levels of corruption are associated with the lower quality public health care and 
education. 
Wei (1997, 2000 a, and 2000b) calculates that a one standard deviation increase in host country 
corruption might be equivalent to an increase of about 30 percentage points in the tax rate in 
terms of its negative effect on economy.  
Perhaps the most important institutions are political institutions. Institutional weakness leads to 
political rents which can be curbed through checks and balances on political agents Keefer 
(2004) and Keefer and Knack (2002). Various studies showed evidence supporting that  political 
freedoms and civil liberties greatly influence growth and welfare  (Kormendi and Meguire 1985; 
Scully 1988; McMillan, Rausser and Johnson 1991).  
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3. Methodology and Data Collection 
In this section we describe the indices, data sources and aggregation methodology. 
 
3.1 Description of Indices 
In this section we describe the computation of the following indices.  
Index of institutionalized Social Technologies  (sci-agg) 
 This index measures technologies that are bundle of information that consists of routines and 
processes imposed by society, which creates positive rents in the economy..  This is an aggregate 
cross national index that encompasses the impact of all institutional performance indicators and 
mainly comprises of Index of Risk Reducing Technologies and the Index of Anti Rent seeking 
Technologies (See Figure 1).  
1. Aggregate Index of Risk reducing Technologies (Sii-agg) 
First component of institutionalized social technology is called risk reducing technology. It 
measures institutional arrangements that reduce transactional risk. A biased or ineffective justice 
system makes property rights insecure for all except those who have power to secure it privately. 
As a result returns to investment for those people would be considerably more than the rest who 
bears higher risk due to insecurity. As a result it will divert individuals and businesses from 
innovative activities to become predictive rent seekers. Risk Reducing technology removes 
information asymmetry, creates mutual trust and hence decreases the risk of creating long term 
business relationships. This intern increase productivity and growth.  
Index of risk reducing technologies further divided into following indices. 
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 a) Contract enforcement and property rights b) Justice system c) Law enforcement  d) Policy 
stability and e). Rule of law index of world governance indicators. There weights in risk 
reducing technology index are 23%, 19%, 20%, 12% and 26% respectively. Different sub 
components of the index of risk reducing technology are briefly elaborate below 
1.1 index of contract enforcement and property rights (Sici): 
This Index of contract enforcement and property rights made up  a) Index of Contract 
Enforcement and b) Index of investment and financial rights protection  
1.1.1 Index of Contract Enforcement: This index captures indicators enforcement cost and time 
spend by businesses, public confidence in legal system, Contract enforcement ranking of 
different surveys. 
1.1.2 Index of investment and financial rights protection: This index covers indicators of 
creditors‘ rights protection, intellectual property rights protection, investors‘ rights index and 
index of property rights with weights of 2%, 34%, 30% and 34% respectively. 
1.1.2.1. Index of property rights: this sub index of index of investment and financial rights 
protection include indicators from different sources namely economic freedom of World, World 
economic forum and Heritage foundation 
1.1.2.2. index of investors rights: This sub index covers indicators pertaining to protection of 
minority shareholders‘ interest as well as general investors protection. Each assigned equal 
weights 
1.2 Index of justice system (SilJi): 
This comprehensive index of justice system measures judicial professionalism, independence, 
efficiency and impartiality and affordability. Specifically it is sub divided into a) Index of 
Judicial professionalism b) Index of Judicial independence c) index of efficiency of judiciary and 
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d) legal system impartiality and affordability with weights of 16%, 32%, 21%, 31% respectively. 
These are further explained below 
1.2.1. Index of Judicial professionalism: This covers numbers of procedural action required until 
the enforcement of judgement. 
1.2.2. Index of Judicial independence: This aggregates different judicial independence measures 
from different sources. 
1.2.3. Index of efficiency of judiciary: This index includes different judicial efficiency measures 
along with people access of justice and duration from lodging a complain to enforcement of 
verdict.   
1.2.4. Legal system impartiality and affordability: This sub index aggregates different indicators 
obtain from surveys of individual and business regarding impartiality of courts, equality of 
citizens under law and access of Citizens to a Non-discriminatory Judiciary, irregular payments 
made for favourable judicial decision, justice affordability, consistency, and honesty of legal 
system. 
1.3 Index of Law Enforcement (SilLi): 
 Proper judicial system should be aided with effective law enforcement mechanism for proper 
enforcement of property rights. This comprehensive index covers various fascist of law 
enforcement notably a) Theft losses, b) Tax evasion, c) Risk of confiscation, d) Organized crime, 
e) Reliability and professionalism of police and other law enforcement services f) Business costs 
of crime and violence and g) Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and 
Disappearance indicators.  All these indicators are weighted equally. 
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1.4 Index of policy stability(sisi): 
 Issue of policy instability mainly arise because of instable political institutions. This component 
of risk reducing technology is covers issues such as 1. Executive Constraints 2.Military 
interference in rule of law and the political process and 3.Stability of Democratic Institutions, are 
focused in this index. All are weighted equally in the index. 
 
2. Index of Anti-Rent seeking Technologies (Ri) 
Predatory rents can be gained through weak institutionalization of risk reducing technologies that 
create loopholes in ineffective or week institutions. Rent-seeking is defined as a situation in 
which an individual or firm makes money by manipulating economic environment rather than by 
profit making through innovation. This index focuses on technologies which helps eliminate 
three kinds of rent. Accordingly it is subdivided into three indices namely index of Institutional 
rents, index of Policy rents and index of Political with weight of 35%, 36% and 29% 
respectively. Brief descriptions of different sub indices are given as under. 
2.1 Index of Institutional Rents (Rii):  
This index exclusively focuses on those rents that arise due to weak institutions. This index 
providing detail coverage of different institutional weakness specially focuses on a) Regulatory 
and Bureaucratic Efficiency b) Ease of doing business and c) Corruption, with weights of 34%, 
32% and 34% respectively. Summary account of each is given below. 
2.1.1 Regulatory and Bureaucratic Efficiency: As noted earlier, effective institutions can only by 
enforced through government and the government implements governance through the 
machinery of Bureaucracy. Hence quality of bureaucracy can determine quality of their 
institutions. This index focus to measures this quality, in terms of  bureaucracy costs and 
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hindrance to business, favouritism in decisions of government officials, and  burden of 
government regulation.  
2.1.2 Ease of doing business: This index focuses all those institutional impediments that prevent 
smooth functioning of businesses. Specifically this index focuses in Time (days), Cost (% of 
income per capita), the number of procedures and other regulatory burden in businesses.  
2.1.3 Corruption:  This index exclusively focuses on the predatory rents extracted by agent in 
office of power. As remarked by Sarte (2001) ―In economies where rent-seeking is a generally 
accepted way of life, one might expect oversight to be difficult. In essence, substantial resources 
would have to be spent to monitor a bureaucracy that is deeply entrenched in a culture of 
corruption‖. This index is further subdivided into a) Index of Corruption, b) Index of Bribery and 
c) Index of Anti Corruption Enforcement, with weights of 43%, 43% and 14% respectively. 
There details are given below.  
2.1.3.1 Index of Corruption: This consists of indicators measuring control of corruption from 
different sources like World Governance Indicators, BERI, PRS and Transparency International. 
2.1.3.2 Index of Bribery: This index exclusively focuses on indicators measuring extent of bribes 
or extra payment given to officials to get there work done by business and individuals. All 
subcomponents are weighted equally. 
2.1.3.3 Index of Anti Corruption Enforcement: This focuses on capacity of state organs to 
enforce Anti corruption measures these pertains to law as well as enforcement agencies. 
2.2 Aggregate Index of Policy rents (Rli-agg):  
There are also rents that arises when government follow protectionist policy creating 
inefficiencies by protecting inefficient businesses. Whatever might be the reason, consonant 
view treats these rents as bad as institutional rents or even worse. This index is  subdivided into 
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a) Index of competition and market excess b) Index of Licences, permits and restriction c) Price 
controls d) Index of Shadow economy and Index of Regulatory quality taken from world 
governance indicators with weights of 21%, 20%, 15%, 18% and 26% respectively. Further 
details are given below 
2.2.1 Index of competition and market excess: This index covers Freedom of Private Businesses 
and Cooperatives to Compete in Markets, Intensity of local competition, Extent of market 
dominance by few players, extent of market liberalization and government owned businesses in 
markets. All sub components are weighted equally.  
2.2.2 Index of Licences, permits and restriction: This sub index of policy rent aggregates 
indicators measuring administrative requirement business have to fulfil, which could includes 
reporting requirements, as well as regulatory restriction in obtaining licences, construction 
permits, or sale of real property. It also includes Land inequality as it indicates policies favouring 
elites. All variables in index are weighted equally. 
2.2.3 Index of Shadow economy: This component of policy rents indicates extent of informal 
economy. Informal or shadow sector normally thrives when there are too much compliance and 
regulatory hindrances that deters small businesses and start-ups. As a result they prefer to go 
unreported and parallel economy emerges. This index aggregates shadow economy indicators, 
assigning equal weights to all. 
2.3 Index of Political Rent (Rpi):  
This index measures the extent of power given by institutions to political authorities. Power 
without accountability and checks would create conflict of interest between political authorities 
and their constituencies. This index is further divided into 1.Index of Political Accountability 
2.Index of political participation and competitiveness 3.Index of Citizen Rights and 4.Index of 
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Voice. With weights of about 19%, 21%, 17% and 21% respectively, while weight of 22% is 
given to Voice and accountability index of world governance indicator. 
2.3.1 Index of Political Accountability: This index covers different aspects of public 
accountability. Specifically in covers possibility that law provides to held top governments 
offices and ministers accountable of their actions. It also measure extent of public disclosure and 
accountability of parliamentarians and whether court can undertake judicial review of 
legislations. It also measures effectiveness of the offices of ombudsman, auditor general or other 
public accountability agency. All indicators are given equal weights. 
2.3.2 Index of political participation and competitiveness: This index measures the extent 
political competitiveness, rules governing chief executive recruiting and elections, level playing 
field provided to political participants, fairness and impartiality of electoral processes and 
freedom to engage in political activities. All subcomponents are weighted equally 
2.3.3 Index of Citizen Rights: This index measures extent of freedom provides to civil society 
organisations, and citizen access to government information and basic government records with 
reasonably time period. All subcomponents are weighted equally 
2.3.4 Index of Voice: This index measures freedom of media and press as well as freedom of 
citizens to voice their concerns. Civil liberties media and press freedom are weighted 35%,30% 
and 35% respectively. 
Figurative description of these indices is provided in Figure 1, whereas description of sub indices 
are provided in table 1. Detail description of their data sources are included in appendix A and B, 
which can be provided upon request. 
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Figure 1: Hierarchical Distribution of Indices 
 
 
 
 
Legend: Index name is displayed in each 
box, followed by Abbreviation (First 
Bracket) and its weights in parent index 
(Second Bracket)  
Source: Authors’ own work 
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3.2 Data Sources and Description 
Our index covers 141 countries, covering almost entire world population. We employ more than 
100 data sources pertaining to these countries in the construction of index.  However data 
sources vary from country to country. Few country like Columbia or Mexico, having extensive 
coverage, have 110 data source each, whereas countries such as Myanmar, North Korea or Cuba 
have comparatively few sources of 19, 21 and 22 respectively. Our index is made up of 141 
variables including indices, covering wide range of institutional measures. For some variables we 
have data for 141 countries and for other less and minimum 32 this makes total of 14,696 data 
points in the index. A point to note that this index provide a measure to judge the level of 
countries‘ institutional development, which might require more than one time performance. 
There is also issue of data availability of different variables as to some data sources, only few 
observation of different time period can be gathered. Therefore for majority of variables in index, 
we take their value as average of 10 to 12 years of recent past. Most of our variables are averages 
from 1995 to 2008. Some variables have only single observations but most of them belong to 
recent past, not earlier than 2000. Detail of timing coverage on each variable is shown in 
appendix A. Moreover institutional variables rarely change over the years. As Kaufmann at al 
(2008), indicates these changes are relatively small, and depict considerably high correlation 
between current and lagged estimates. Even if some variable significantly change over time, its 
effect in aggregate index would not be much and would not produce any significant effect in the 
short run analysis.   
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3.3 Aggregation Methodology 
 
3.3.1 Normalization Procedure 
Because of different measuring scales used in different variables, to include them in index, we 
use normalization treatment thereby converting each variable to an index with a zero to one 
scale, where higher values denote more strong institutions. When higher values of the original 
variable indicate weak institutions (like country ranks), the formula (Vmax-Vi)/(Vmax-Vmin) is 
used for transformation. Conversely, when higher values indicate strong institutions, the formula 
(Vi-Vmin)/(Vmax- Vmin) is used. Here Vi=original values, Vmax = Maximum value attained by 
country in original index, Vmin = Minimum value attained by country in original index. Similar 
strategy is being employed in creation of various indices notably Gwartney and Lawson (2008), 
Miller and Holmes (2009) and Schwab and Porter (2008) 
 
3.3.2 Treatment of Outliers 
Few variables had value that varies widely in the original set. E.g. Number of days required for 
contract enforcement, which may go up to 1700 days. For these variables the maximum range 
(Vmax) is set at 1.25 standard deviations above average and countries with values outside of the 
Vmax receives ratings equivalent to highest value of the country which is inside the range. 
 
3.3.3 Weighting and Aggregation methodology. 
Principal component analysis is used to determine the weight given to each component in the 
construction of the index. This procedure partitions the variance of a set of variables and uses it 
to determine the linear combination—the weights— of these variables that maximizes the 
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variation of the newly constructed principal component. In effect, the newly constructed 
principal component is the variable that captures the variation of the underlying components 
most fully. It is an objective method of combining a set of variables into a single variable that 
best reflects the original data. As Gwartney and Lawson (2001: 7) point out, this procedure is 
particularly appropriate when several sub-components measure different aspects of a principal 
component. The component weights derived by this procedure are shown in parentheses in 
Figure 1. The same procedure was also used to derive the weights for the sub indices that are 
used  in the construction of main indices referred in Figure1. 
More specifically first, principal components analysis is used to extract factors (Manly, 1994). 
We choose factors that fulfil these considerations: (i) have associated eigenvalues larger than 
one; (ii) contribute individually to the explanation of overall variance by more than 10%; and 
(iii) contribute cumulatively to the explanation of the overall variance by more than 60%. Details 
of extracted factors of 10 major indices are provided in table 2. These factors are then rotated in 
order to minimise the number of individual indicators that have a high loading on the same 
factor. The idea behind transforming the factorial axes is to obtain a ―simpler structure‖ of the 
factors. Rotation is a standard step in factor analysis – it changes the factor loadings and hence 
the interpretation of the factors, while leaving unchanged the analytical solutions obtained ex-
ante and ex-post the rotation. Weights are then calculated through the square of factor loadings 
after rotation which represents the proportion of the total unit variance of the indicator which is 
explained by the factor. Similar approach is used by Nicoletti et al., (2000) that is of grouping 
the individual components with the highest factors loadings into intermediate Factor. These 
Factors aggregated by assigning a weight to each one of them equal to the proportion of the 
explained variance in the data set. The components of extracted and rotated factors along with 
21 
 
component weights of 10 major indices are given in table 3. For Aggregation, we employ linear 
aggregation which is the summation of weighted and normalised individual indicators: 
 
3.3.4  Treatment of Missing data 
We also employ in our analysis dynamic weighing thereby removing the effect of unavailable 
data from index. There might be instances where country values are not available for a certain 
variable. Our dynamic weighting regime removes value from the index calculations when no 
data are present in certain variable for a certain country. Then the variable weight is spread 
among others remaining variables -for which data are present in proportion to their ratio of their 
respective weights divided by sum of all remaining weights. Similar weighting regime is also 
employed in Schwab and Porter (2008) for their construction of world competitive index 
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4. Results and Comparisons 
This section reports index of institutionalized social technologies and its sub indices. Ten major 
indices are provided as depicted from Table 4, other sub indices can be made available upon 
request. We have also undertaken exercise of comparing our index of Institutionalized social 
technology with other indices. Many indices are available in literature covering various issues of 
development but to our knowledge no published index exists that cover more or less the same 
variables that are covered in our index. For the purpose of comparison, we have selected seven 
indices that can said to be partially related to our index. These are 1) Status Index 2006, 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), Bertelsmann Foundation, Berlin, Germany, 
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de, 2) Average Country Ranking (1996-2006), Economic Freedom of 
the World, Economic Freedom Network, Fraser Institute, 3) Average Overall Country Score 
(1995-2009), Index of Economic Freedom, The heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & 
Company, Inc., 4) Institutions Score, Global Competitive Report 2007-08, World Economic 
Forum, and 5) Average Country Score (2004-08), Global integrity index, Global Integrity Report 
www.globalintegrity.org . 6) Country risk rankings, euromoney  <www.euromoney.com>   and 
7) Democracy Rank, World audit , World  Concern, England  <www.worldaudit.org> 
For comparison, we carry out Spearmen‘s Rank Correlation focussing on ordinal information as 
well as Pearson correlation focussing on the interval between observations. The results show our 
indexes have a high degree of correlation among all and all coefficients are also highly 
significant.   
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Table 1 
Description of Sub indices 
Sub Indices 
Extracted 
Factors 
Components 
Abbreviation Name 
Weights 
in Sub 
index 
Index of 
Regulatory and 
Bureaucratic 
Efficiency  (RiBi ) 
  
RiB1  Bureaucracy costs 0.14 
RiB2 Bureaucracy Hindrance to Business 0.12 
RiB3 Favoritism in decisions of government officials 0.15 
RiB4 Burden of government regulation 0.11 
RiB5 Government Effectiveness-ICRG 0.15 
RiB6 Government Effectiveness-BERI 0.16 
RiB7 Government Effectiveness-WGI 0.17 
Index of Ease of 
doing business 
(Riei) 
F1 
Rie2 Starting a business-EFW 0.15 
Rie3 Starting a Business-doing business index-Rank 0.14 
Rie4 
Starting a Business-doing business index-Time 
(days) 0.17 
Rie8 Regulatory Quality-ICRG 0.08 
F2 
Rie1 Business Freedom-HI 0.09 
Rie5 
Starting a Business-doing business index-Cost (% 
of income per capita) 0.12 
Rie6 regulation of entry-The number of  procedures 0.05 
Rie7 
regulation of entry-cost+time as share of per 
capita GDP 0.19 
Index of Bribery 
(RicBrii) 
F1 
RicBri1 bribe-Enterprise Survey 0.23 
RicBri2 Extra payments/bribes-EFW 0.09 
RicBri5 Bribery-Enterprise Survey 0.23 
F2 
RicBri3 Bribery(FJKZ) 0.23 
RicBri4 Exporter Bribery Index 0.23 
Index of 
Corruption 
(RicCori) 
  
RicCor1 corruption-Enterprise Survey 0.07 
RicCor2 Corruption- 0.13 
RicCor3  Public Sector Ethics Index(PSEI) 0.12 
RicCor4 Corruption-LLSV 0.10 
RicCor5 Control of Corruption-ICRG 0.11 
RicCor6 Control of Corruption-BERI 0.10 
RicCor7 TI-Corruption Presception Index 0.13 
RicCor8 Corporate Ethics Index 0.11 
RicCor9 Control of Corruption-WGI 0.13 
Index of Anti 
Corruption 
Enforcement 
(RicEnfi) 
  
RicEnf1 Anti-Corruption Law 0.50 
RicEnf2 Anti-Corruption Agency 0.5 
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 index of 
competition and 
market excess 
(Rlci) 
F1 
Rlc1 Type of Economic Organization 0.11 
Rlc3 Intensity of local competition 0.25 
Rlc4 Extent of market dominance 0.23 
F2 Rlc2 
Freedom of Private Businesses and Cooperatives 
to Compete in Markets 0.27 
Rlc5 Market Organization-bertelsmann 0.14 
Index of 
Liscences, 
permits and 
restriction (RlLi) 
F1 
RlL3 
Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real 
property 0.09 
RlL4 Licensing restrictions 0.16 
RlL5 Dealing with Construction Permits-Rank 0.16 
RlL7 GiniLand inequality 0.14 
F2 
RlL1 Administrative requirements-EFW 0.17 
RlL2 Administrative requirements-enterprise survey 0.08 
RlL6 
Business Licensing and Regulation-Global 
integrity 0.19 
Index of Shadow 
economy (Rlsi) 
F1 
Rls1 informal sector 0.09 
Rls2 shadow economy as % of GDP-Schnider 0.29 
Rls4 Unofficial Economy-FJKZ 0.29 
F2 Rls3 black market premium 0.32 
Index of Political 
Accountability 
(RpAi) 
  
RpA1 Executive Accountability 0.28 
RpA2 Legislative Accountability 0.29 
RpA3 National Ombudsman 0.16 
RpA4 Supreme Audit Institution 0.27 
Index of political 
participation and 
competitiveness 
(RpPi) 
  
RpP1 executive recruitment 0.23 
RpP2 Political Competition 0.24 
RpP3 Political Participation 0.26 
RpP4 Political Right 0.27 
Index of Citizen 
Rights (RpRi) 
  
RpR1 Civil Society Organizations 0.50 
RpR2 Public Access to Information 0.50 
Index of Voice 
(RpVi) 
  
RpV1 Media Fredom 0.30 
RpV2 Civil Liberties 0.35 
RpV3 press fredom index-Rank 0.35 
Index of Contract 
Enforcement 
(SicCi) 
F1 
SicC1 Legal enforcement of contracts 0.19 
SicC2 Enforcing Contracts-Rank-doing bussiness 0.21 
SicC3 Enforcing Contracts-Time (days)-doing bussiness 0.18 
SicC4 
Enforcing Contracts-Cost (% of claim)-doing 
bussiness 0.16 
F2 
SicC5 Contract enforceability-BERI 0.05 
SicC6 Confidence in legal system 0.21 
index of investors 
rights (SicP-ini) 
  
SicPin1 Investor rights index-ZK 0.38 
SicPin2 Protection of minority shareholders’ interests 0.38 
SicPin3 Investor (minority stake) Protection Index 0.24 
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Index of property 
rights (SicP-pri) 
  
SicPpr1  Protection of property rights -EFW 0.25 
SicPpr2 Property rights-WEF 0.30 
SicPpr3 Property Rights-HF 0.26 
SicPpr4 Private Property-BTI 0.19 
Index of Judicial 
independence 
(SiljJdi) 
  
SilJd1 Judicial independence-EFW 0.43 
SilJd2 Judicial independence-WEF 0.43 
SilJd3 Judicial independence-LLPS 0.14 
index of 
effeciency of 
judiciary (SilJfi) 
F1 
SilJf1 Efficiency of Judiciary-LLSV 0.22 
SilJf2 Efficiency of legal framework-WEF 0.25 
SilJf8 index mandatory time limits 0.18 
F2 
SilJf6 Assess to justic index 0.21 
silJf7 Total Duration 0.14 
legal system 
impartiality and 
affordability 
(SilJii) 
F1 
SilJi2  Impartial courts-EFW 0.16 
SilJi4 Irregular payments in judicial decision 0.16 
SilJi5 Legal system is affordable 0.10 
SilJi6 Legal system is consistent 0.16 
SilJi7 Legal system is honest and uncorrupt 0.16 
F2 
SilJi1 judicual system-Enterprise Survey 0.12 
SilJi3 
Equality of Citizens Under the Law and Access of 
Citizens to  a Non-discriminatory Judiciary 0.14 
Index of Judicial 
professionalism 
(Siljpi) 
  
SilJp2 Index Judges and Lawyers 0.50 
SilJp1 Independent procedural actions 0.50 
Index of Law 
enforcement 
(SilLi) 
F1 
SilL3 tax evasion 0.12 
SilL4 risk of confiscation 0.06 
SilL6 Reliability of police services 0.06 
SilL8 police-Law Enforcement 0.09 
SilL9 Physical Integrity Rights Index 0.11 
F2 
SilL5  Organized crime 0.13 
SilL7 Business costs of crime and violence 0.16 
F3 
SilL1 theft losses-Enterprise Survey 0.15 
SilL2 theft-Enterprise Survey 0.12 
Index of policy 
stability (Sisi) 
  
Sis1 Executive Constraints 0.38 
Sis2 
 Military interference in rule of law and the 
political process 0.21 
Sis3 Stability of Democratic Institutions 0.41 
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Table 2 
Factor Extraction and Rotation of 10 major indices based on Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
S. 
N0. 
Indices 
Extracted 
Factors Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
   
Eigen 
values 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Eigen 
values 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 SilLi 
1 4.954828 55.053643 55.05364 2.796594 31.07327 31.07327 
2 1.357936 15.088176 70.14182 2.376991 26.41101 57.48428 
3 1.219172 13.546353 83.68817 2.35835 26.20389 83.68817 
2 Sisi 1 2.103962 70.132053 70.13205 
   3 Rli 1 3.502067 70.041346 70.04135 
   4 Rpi 1 4.134938 82.698769 82.69877 
   5 Sici 1 1.535679 76.783951 76.78395 
   6 SilJi 1 2.793826 69.845645 69.84564 
   7 Rii 1 2.620346 87.344864 87.34486 
   8 Ri 1 2.520509 84.016956 84.01696 
   9 Sii 1 3.674667 73.49333 73.49333 
   
10 
sci 
(IIST) 1 1.939657 96.982833 96.98283 
    
 
 
Table 3 
Extracted Factor loadings and weights of 10 major indices 
 
 
 
S. 
N0. 
Indices 
Compo
nents 
Rotated Factor loadings Squared Factor loadings 
Squared Factor loadings 
(Scaled to unity) 
Weights 
Weights 
(Scaled 
to unity) 
      1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
  
1 SilLi 
SilL1 0.227 0.067 0.927 0.051 0.005 0.859 0.018 0.002 0.364 0.114 0.15 
SilL2 0.085 0.394 0.847 0.007 0.155 0.717 0.003 0.065 0.304 0.095 0.12 
SilL3 0.843 -0.057 0.419 0.711 0.003 0.176 0.254 0.001 0.075 0.094 0.12 
SilL4 0.601 0.376 0.498 0.361 0.142 0.248 0.129 0.060 0.105 0.048 0.06 
SilL5 0.406 0.872 0.089 0.165 0.760 0.008 0.059 0.320 0.003 0.101 0.13 
SilL6 0.588 0.516 0.358 0.345 0.266 0.128 0.123 0.112 0.054 0.046 0.06 
SilL7 0.062 0.950 0.262 0.004 0.903 0.069 0.001 0.380 0.029 0.120 0.16 
SilL8 0.722 0.240 0.298 0.521 0.058 0.089 0.186 0.024 0.038 0.069 0.09 
SilL9 0.794 0.291 -0.255 0.631 0.085 0.065 0.226 0.036 0.028 0.084 0.11 
Sum 
   
2.797 2.377 2.358 
   
0.771 
 Factor Weights 0.371 0.316 0.313 
      
32 
 
Extracted Factor loadings and weights (continued) 
 
S. N0. Indices Components Extracted 
Factor 
loadings 
Squared 
Factor 
loadings 
Squared 
Factor 
loadings 
Scaled to 
unity 
Weights 
2 Sisi 
Sis1 0.89892 0.8080576 0.384065 0.38 
Sis2 0.664208 0.4411727 0.209687 0.21 
Sis3 0.924517 0.8547313 0.406249 0.41 
Sum 
 
2.1039616 
  
3 Rli 
Rliagg1 0.951899 0.9061125 0.258736 0.26 
Rlci 0.858977 0.737842 0.210688 0.21 
RlLi 0.836671 0.7000182 0.199887 0.2 
Rlp1 0.73273 0.5368937 0.153308 0.15 
Rlsi 0.788163 0.6212009 0.177381 0.18 
Sum 
 
3.5020673 
  
4 Rpi 
RpAi 0.878761 0.7722211 0.186755 0.19 
RpPi 0.926747 0.8588602 0.207708 0.21 
RpRi 0.852119 0.7261073 0.175603 0.17 
RpVi 0.931018 0.8667947 0.209627 0.21 
RpVA1 0.95444 0.9109552 0.220307 0.22 
Sum 
 
4.1349384 
  
5 Sici 
SicCi 0.876265 0.7678395 0.5 0.5 
SicPi 0.876265 0.7678395 0.5 0.5 
Sum 
 
1.535679 
  
6 SilJi 
Siljpi -0.65831 0.4333758 0.155119 0.16 
SiljJdi 0.94514 0.8932896 0.319737 0.32 
SilJfi 0.769648 0.5923574 0.212024 0.21 
SilJii 0.935309 0.8748031 0.31312 0.31 
Sum 
 
2.7938258 
  
7 
Rii 
RiBi 0.949658 0.9018507 0.344172 0.34 
Riei 0.910179 0.8284267 0.316152 0.32 
Rici 0.943434 0.8900686 0.339676 0.34 
Sum 
 
2.6203459 
  
8 Ri 
Rii 0.941688 0.8867758 0.351824 0.35 
Rli 0.951529 0.9054068 0.359216 0.36 
Rpi 0.85342 0.7283261 0.28896 0.29 
Sum 
 
2.5205087 
  
9 Sii 
Siiagg1 0.969809 0.9405291 0.25595 0.26 
Sici 0.924976 0.8555812 0.232832 0.23 
SilJi 0.841383 0.7079248 0.19265 0.19 
SilLi 0.850475 0.723308 0.196836 0.2 
Sisi 0.668822 0.4473233 0.121732 0.12 
Sum 
 
3.6746665 
  
10 sci (IIST) 
sii 0.984799 0.9698283 0.5 0.5 
ri 0.984799 0.9698283 0.5 0.5 
Sum 
 
1.9396567 
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Table 4 
The Index of Institutionalized Social Technology and its sub indices (sorted by Rank) 
 
Rank Countries 
Institutio
nalized 
Social 
Technol
ogies 
(sci) 
  
Index of 
Institutionalized 
Social Technologies 
(sci) 
Index of Anti Rent seeking 
Technologies (Ri) 
Index of Risk reducing Technologies (Sii) 
Anti Rent 
seeking 
Technolo
gies (Ri) 
Risk 
reducing 
Technolo
gies (Sii) 
Institution
al Rents 
(Rii) 
 Policy 
rents (Rli) 
Political 
Rent 
(Rpi) 
Contract 
Enforcem
ent and 
Property 
Rights 
(Sici) 
Justice 
System 
(SilJi) 
Law 
Enforcem
ent (SilLi) 
Policy 
Stability 
(Sisi) 
1 FINLAND 0.9336 0.9295 0.9377 0.9311 0.8738 0.9966 0.9159 0.8345 0.9727 0.9999 
2 DENMARK 0.9287 0.9280 0.9295 0.9236 0.8804 0.9922 0.8967 0.8257 0.9630 0.9987 
3 ICELAND 0.9173 0.9077 0.9269 0.9372 0.8128 0.9900 0.9108 0.7644 0.9875 0.9951 
4 SWITZERLAND 0.9129 0.9077 0.9180 0.8897 0.8637 0.9840 0.8728 0.8078 0.9201 0.9999 
5 NEW ZEALAND 0.9120 0.9177 0.9064 0.9228 0.8564 0.9875 0.9295 0.7374 0.8996 0.9999 
6 NORWAY 0.9081 0.8864 0.9298 0.8862 0.7992 0.9950 0.9029 0.7789 0.9817 0.9999 
7 SWEDEN 0.8934 0.9056 0.8813 0.8915 0.8543 0.9861 0.8034 0.8003 0.8769 0.9850 
8 NETHERLANDS 0.8857 0.8903 0.8812 0.8694 0.8276 0.9932 0.8486 0.8148 0.8281 0.9999 
9 AUSTRIA 0.8827 0.8595 0.9059 0.7907 0.8437 0.9622 0.8856 0.7810 0.9143 0.9997 
10 LUXEMBOURG 0.8765 0.8517 0.9013 0.8436 0.7493 0.9887 0.8961 0.7152 0.9376 0.9999 
11 AUSTRALIA 0.8725 0.8662 0.8789 0.8528 0.8233 0.9356 0.8536 0.7460 0.8707 0.9975 
12 GERMANY 0.8635 0.8464 0.8807 0.7893 0.8430 0.9194 0.8620 0.7164 0.9129 0.9990 
13 IRELAND 0.8629 0.8629 0.8628 0.8238 0.8116 0.9738 0.8049 0.7680 0.8679 0.9999 
14 UNITED KINGDOM 0.8551 0.8763 0.8339 0.8696 0.8330 0.9380 0.8443 0.7206 0.6937 0.9943 
15 CANADA 0.8511 0.8653 0.8370 0.8648 0.8264 0.9140 0.8043 0.6622 0.7982 0.9956 
16 UNITED STATES 0.8372 0.8725 0.8020 0.8395 0.8907 0.8897 0.8520 0.5906 0.7306 0.9309 
17 BELGIUM 0.8292 0.8132 0.8452 0.7624 0.7483 0.9550 0.8401 0.6977 0.8651 0.9931 
18 HONG KONG 0.8223 0.8142 0.8304 0.8511 0.8752 0.6940 0.9273 0.7250 0.9226 0.6717 
19 SINGAPORE 0.8042 0.7755 0.8329 0.9490 0.8969 0.4154 0.9606 0.7614 0.9099 0.3690 
20 JAPAN 0.8040 0.7958 0.8122 0.7532 0.7918 0.8523 0.8240 0.6738 0.7718 0.9755 
21 ESTONIA 0.7875 0.8033 0.7716 0.7455 0.8034 0.8731 0.7844 0.6688 0.8276 0.9651 
22 FRANCE 0.7781 0.7932 0.7630 0.7506 0.7837 0.8564 0.7586 0.5827 0.7816 0.8377 
23 CYPRUS 0.7651 0.7558 0.7743 0.7017 0.6762 0.9200 0.7563 0.6507 0.8673 0.9361 
24 CHILE 0.7623 0.7845 0.7401 0.7269 0.8169 0.8137 0.6959 0.5841 0.7486 0.9121 
25 BAHAMAS 0.7610 0.7594 0.7626 0.7605 0.6152 0.9371 0.6688 0.6557 0.7877 0.9659 
26 PORTUGAL 0.7536 0.7532 0.7541 0.6902 0.6724 0.9295 0.6187 0.6173 0.8372 0.9998 
27 SPAIN 0.7507 0.7580 0.7434 0.6622 0.7420 0.8934 0.6719 0.5202 0.8210 0.9384 
28 MALTA 0.7414 0.6901 0.7927 0.6310 0.5392 0.9487 0.7397 0.5523 0.9216 0.9623 
29 HUNGARY 0.7393 0.7382 0.7405 0.6263 0.7128 0.9048 0.7639 0.5465 0.7879 0.9761 
30 TAIWAN 0.7354 0.7618 0.7089 0.7016 0.7499 0.8494 0.6956 0.5609 0.7850 0.8136 
31 ISRAEL 0.7275 0.7474 0.7076 0.7263 0.6781 0.8588 0.6684 0.7135 0.6420 0.8187 
32 SLOVENIA 0.7205 0.7424 0.6986 0.6963 0.6408 0.9242 0.5772 0.5010 0.8198 0.9467 
33 KOREA, SOUTH 0.7158 0.7029 0.7288 0.6637 0.6503 0.8155 0.7930 0.5739 0.7829 0.8167 
34 CZECH REPUBLIC 0.7080 0.7423 0.6736 0.6005 0.7521 0.9014 0.5897 0.4455 0.7586 0.9731 
35 LATVIA 0.7024 0.7099 0.6949 0.6226 0.6766 0.8566 0.7644 0.4701 0.8050 0.8945 
36 LITHUANIA 0.6985 0.7245 0.6725 0.6383 0.6939 0.8665 0.6869 0.4712 0.7401 0.9393 
37 SLOVAKIA 0.6867 0.7200 0.6534 0.5873 0.7184 0.8820 0.6647 0.4129 0.7403 0.9574 
38 SOUTH AFRICA 0.6819 0.7405 0.6232 0.6991 0.6844 0.8600 0.6725 0.6046 0.4843 0.9104 
39 GREECE 0.6794 0.6812 0.6777 0.5219 0.6791 0.8758 0.5795 0.5108 0.7680 0.9161 
40 URUGUAY 0.6776 0.6746 0.6806 0.6022 0.5717 0.8897 0.5967 0.6631 0.6699 0.9573 
41 COSTA RICA 0.6759 0.7010 0.6509 0.5608 0.7053 0.8647 0.5242 0.6095 0.6155 0.9738 
42 POLAND 0.6550 0.6799 0.6300 0.5596 0.6243 0.8941 0.5908 0.3792 0.6913 0.9733 
34 
 
43 ITALY 0.6540 0.6935 0.6144 0.5480 0.6710 0.8970 0.4613 0.4403 0.6241 0.9972 
44 BOTSWANA 0.6504 0.6431 0.6578 0.6198 0.5412 0.7976 0.6207 0.5939 0.6367 0.8229 
45 NAMIBIA 0.6424 0.6253 0.6594 0.5831 0.5841 0.7274 0.7213 0.6962 0.6137 0.7547 
46 JORDAN 0.6279 0.6099 0.6460 0.6188 0.6667 0.5285 0.6188 0.6624 0.8740 0.3414 
47 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 0.6190 0.5854 0.6527 0.6999 0.7189 0.2815 0.6049 0.6096 0.8679 0.3020 
48 THAILAND 0.6146 0.5931 0.6361 0.5683 0.5732 0.6477 0.7231 0.4917 0.6740 0.7600 
49 MALAYSIA 0.6055 0.5921 0.6189 0.6616 0.6327 0.4578 0.7215 0.5926 0.6101 0.4090 
50 QATAR 0.6050 0.5481 0.6619 0.6363 0.6890 0.2669 0.6508 0.7903 0.9163 0.0000 
51 ROMANIA 0.6039 0.6219 0.5858 0.5539 0.5519 0.7911 0.5787 0.4321 0.7155 0.8427 
52 KUWAIT 0.6024 0.5344 0.6704 0.5588 0.6285 0.3880 0.6747 0.5996 0.7868 0.5103 
53 OMAN 0.6019 0.5182 0.6856 0.6727 0.6045 0.2244 0.6548 0.7206 0.8173 0.4056 
54 BULGARIA 0.6013 0.6477 0.5550 0.5496 0.5981 0.8277 0.5331 0.3668 0.6140 0.9171 
55 PANAMA 0.5940 0.6301 0.5580 0.5903 0.5805 0.7396 0.5218 0.4366 0.6305 0.8290 
56 JAMAICA 0.5931 0.6530 0.5332 0.6115 0.5655 0.8116 0.6015 0.4609 0.4253 0.9651 
57 CROATIA 0.5922 0.5909 0.5936 0.5880 0.4964 0.7117 0.5882 0.3575 0.7616 0.8552 
58 INDIA 0.5853 0.5844 0.5862 0.4834 0.5802 0.7116 0.4463 0.5951 0.6129 0.8517 
59 TURKEY 0.5788 0.5901 0.5674 0.5624 0.6024 0.6083 0.5681 0.4746 0.5570 0.8138 
60 BAHRAIN 0.5772 0.5429 0.6115 0.6634 0.6413 0.2755 0.6846 0.5074 0.7757 0.2167 
61 GHANA 0.5750 0.5628 0.5872 0.5081 0.5037 0.7022 0.6144 0.5375 0.6891 0.6741 
62 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 0.5661 0.6052 0.5270 0.5375 0.4826 0.8393 0.4999 0.4484 0.3488 0.9353 
63 TUNISIA 0.5586 0.5286 0.5885 0.6756 0.5927 0.2717 0.6678 0.6123 0.7238 0.2411 
64 MONGOLIA 0.5569 0.5851 0.5287 0.5362 0.5270 0.7163 0.6098 0.1694 0.5972 0.8559 
65 BRUNEI 0.5464 0.4855 0.6073 0.5320 0.6327 0.2467 0.5396 0.5680 0.6792 
 66 ARGENTINA 0.5368 0.5885 0.4852 0.5233 0.5152 0.7582 0.4732 0.3600 0.5209 0.7623 
67 MEXICO 0.5362 0.5864 0.4859 0.5080 0.5824 0.6860 0.5258 0.4048 0.4588 0.7265 
68 SENEGAL 0.5357 0.5249 0.5466 0.4897 0.5200 0.5733 0.5153 0.4235 0.7317 0.6570 
69 SRI LANKA 0.5309 0.5517 0.5100 0.6022 0.5351 0.5115 0.5290 0.3772 0.5525 0.5573 
70 MALI 0.5272 0.5267 0.5277 0.3643 0.5140 0.7386 0.4327 0.4898 0.6864 0.6799 
71 BRAZIL 0.5257 0.5677 0.4837 0.4242 0.5855 0.7187 0.5198 0.3814 0.3986 0.7951 
72 EL SALVADOR 0.5217 0.5962 0.4472 0.5079 0.5874 0.7136 0.5801 0.3473 0.3083 0.7032 
73 PHILIPPINES 0.5183 0.5510 0.4856 0.4692 0.5134 0.6964 0.4574 0.4246 0.4963 0.7490 
74 MALAWI 0.5181 0.5395 0.4967 0.4896 0.4999 0.6488 0.4111 0.5459 0.5421 0.6529 
75 GUYANA 0.5146 0.5609 0.4684 0.5268 0.4336 0.7602 0.5039 0.3090 0.4852 0.7282 
76 ARMENIA 0.5140 0.5135 0.5145 0.5584 0.4537 0.5336 0.6392 0.2645 0.7019 0.5743 
77 MOROCCO 0.5135 0.4987 0.5283 0.6146 0.5109 0.3437 0.5371 0.4401 0.7288 0.3119 
78 MOLDOVA 0.5027 0.5044 0.5010 0.5083 0.4254 0.5976 0.6474 0.2088 0.6335 0.6794 
79 LEBANON 0.5025 0.4943 0.5107 0.4600 0.5289 0.4928 0.5478 0.5498 0.3681 0.7405 
80 COLOMBIA 0.5024 0.5619 0.4429 0.5094 0.6013 0.5765 0.3983 0.4679 0.4734 0.6360 
81 MADAGASCAR 0.5004 0.5252 0.4756 0.5062 0.4320 0.6638 0.4809 0.3176 0.5578 0.6558 
82 GAMBIA 0.4989 0.4395 0.5584 0.4764 0.4937 0.3277 0.6195 0.7387 0.6294 0.1410 
83 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0.4969 0.5429 0.4509 0.4138 0.5241 0.7221 0.5060 0.3595 0.3901 0.6944 
84 SAUDI ARABIA 0.4894 0.4493 0.5294 0.5435 0.6549 0.0805 0.5859 0.5981 0.6327 0.0000 
85 ZAMBIA 0.4877 0.4595 0.5159 0.4973 0.3777 0.5154 0.5609 0.4853 0.5781 0.6507 
86 UKRAINE 0.4855 0.4993 0.4718 0.4491 0.4218 0.6561 0.4655 0.3260 0.6507 0.6816 
87 PAPUA NEW GUINEA 0.4840 0.5360 0.4319 0.4658 0.4671 0.7062 0.4080 0.2611 0.6266 0.6483 
88 NICARAGUA 0.4837 0.5038 0.4636 0.4506 0.4309 0.6584 0.5323 0.1816 0.6373 0.7119 
89 EGYPT 0.4824 0.4232 0.5416 0.5345 0.3960 0.3228 0.5108 0.5751 0.6887 0.3484 
90 ALBANIA 0.4786 0.4908 0.4664 0.4352 0.4396 0.6214 0.5010 0.2794 0.6093 0.7472 
91 KAZAKHSTAN 0.4758 0.4913 0.4602 0.5433 0.4777 0.4454 0.5759 0.4169 0.6619 0.2838 
92 PERU 0.4745 0.5512 0.3978 0.4976 0.5522 0.6147 0.4011 0.3657 0.2813 0.6866 
93 INDONESIA 0.4737 0.5142 0.4332 0.4394 0.5447 0.5667 0.3534 0.3533 0.6273 0.5804 
94 SERBIA 0.4733 0.4795 0.4672 0.5032 0.3474 0.6147 0.4751 0.2929 0.6439 0.7553 
95 BOLIVIA 0.4732 0.4909 0.4555 0.3216 0.4939 0.6915 0.3981 0.3183 0.5615 0.7380 
96 HONDURAS 0.4706 0.5205 0.4207 0.4239 0.5133 0.6460 0.4026 0.3981 0.4311 0.6613 
97 ECUADOR 0.4668 0.5116 0.4221 0.4326 0.4904 0.6330 0.4850 0.3191 0.5049 0.4776 
35 
 
98 SURINAME 0.4649 0.4681 0.4618 0.2902 0.4203 0.7421 0.3196 0.5051 0.5730 
 99 CHINA 0.4647 0.4379 0.4915 0.4863 0.5272 0.2687 0.5913 0.4774 0.6134 0.2402 
100 TANZANIA 0.4646 0.4312 0.4981 0.4155 0.3582 0.5406 0.5574 0.4588 0.5633 0.4974 
101 KENYA 0.4632 0.5271 0.3993 0.4489 0.5799 0.5559 0.4883 0.3720 0.3810 0.5376 
102 UGANDA 0.4622 0.4927 0.4317 0.4750 0.4833 0.5259 0.4851 0.3866 0.5042 0.4026 
103 AZERBAIJAN 0.4561 0.4333 0.4789 0.5038 0.3999 0.3897 0.6176 0.4198 0.7217 0.2489 
104 BELARUS 0.4541 0.4168 0.4914 0.4526 0.4404 0.3441 0.5749 0.6403 0.7471 0.1440 
105 GUATEMALA 0.4495 0.5226 0.3763 0.4726 0.5217 0.5840 0.4213 0.3960 0.2651 0.6157 
106 GABON 0.4471 0.4384 0.4558 0.4757 0.4300 0.4038 0.4309 0.4786 0.6685 0.2325 
107 RUSSIA 0.4461 0.4444 0.4479 0.4243 0.3992 0.5247 0.5147 0.3424 0.5748 0.5543 
108 PARAGUAY 0.4416 0.4780 0.4053 0.3230 0.5282 0.6027 0.4730 0.3144 0.3625 0.7157 
109 NIGER 0.4388 0.3909 0.4867 0.2874 0.3850 0.5231 0.4214 0.3281 0.8290 0.6125 
110 VIETNAM 0.4349 0.4077 0.4621 0.4526 0.5921 0.1246 0.5283 0.4026 0.6474 0.2442 
111 PAKISTAN 0.4341 0.4663 0.4019 0.4818 0.4547 0.4619 0.4685 0.4376 0.4939 0.2002 
112 ETHIOPIA 0.4310 0.4422 0.4197 0.4763 0.4132 0.4372 0.5174 0.2945 0.6319 0.2072 
113 BURKINA FASO 0.4309 0.4098 0.4519 0.3407 0.3948 0.5119 0.4316 0.3767 0.6064 0.4578 
114 KYRGYZSTAN 0.4214 0.4459 0.3968 0.4770 0.4129 0.4494 0.5680 0.1941 0.5500 0.3055 
115 MOZAMBIQUE 0.4199 0.4580 0.3819 0.4470 0.3343 0.6247 0.2941 0.3671 0.4274 0.5523 
116 BANGLADESH 0.4187 0.4052 0.4321 0.3355 0.4047 0.4901 0.3431 0.4622 0.5309 0.6056 
117 SIERRA LEONE 0.3989 0.4255 0.3722 0.4021 0.3854 0.5036 0.3525 0.2409 0.6000 0.5224 
118 NIGERIA 0.3876 0.3974 0.3778 0.3774 0.3672 0.4591 0.4756 0.4148 0.3584 0.5338 
119 ALGERIA 0.3845 0.3673 0.4017 0.4563 0.3807 0.2433 0.4630 0.3900 0.5297 0.2431 
120 YEMEN 0.3826 0.4007 0.3646 0.3547 0.5294 0.2963 0.5660 
 
0.3895 0.1378 
121 VENEZUELA 0.3769 0.4315 0.3223 0.2867 0.3927 0.6545 0.3491 0.2980 0.2779 0.4907 
122 SYRIA 0.3767 0.3047 0.4488 0.3622 0.4154 0.0979 0.4488 0.4402 0.6556 0.1563 
123 IRAN 0.3754 0.3966 0.3541 0.4731 0.3497 0.3626 0.4433 0.3645 0.2090 0.3574 
124 GUINEA 0.3609 0.3392 0.3825 0.2833 0.4019 0.3290 0.4823 0.5288 0.4134 0.2180 
125 GUINEA-BISSAU 0.3517 0.3795 0.3238 0.1920 0.4664 0.4978 0.2640 0.1705 0.6072 0.4631 
126 CAMEROON 0.3511 0.3677 0.3344 0.3342 0.4048 0.3622 0.3621 0.2455 0.5432 0.2428 
127 TOGO 0.3345 0.3118 0.3571 0.2094 0.3829 0.3473 0.4183 0.3241 0.5100 0.1414 
128 LIBERIA 0.3237 0.2880 0.3593 0.2307 0.2070 0.4578 0.3208 0.8095 0.3459 0.2180 
129 ZIMBABWE 0.3139 0.2986 0.3291 0.3327 0.2276 0.3456 0.4380 0.3264 0.4087 0.2427 
130 LIBYA 0.2963 0.2059 0.3867 0.2950 0.2185 0.0830 0.2436 0.5122 0.7214 0.0000 
131 HAITI 0.2952 0.3052 0.2851 0.1881 0.3701 0.3661 0.4073 0.0990 0.4512 0.3525 
132 ANGOLA 0.2931 0.2669 0.3193 0.2509 0.2690 0.2838 0.3543 0.3136 0.4984 0.2422 
133 COTE D'IVOIRE 0.2906 0.3321 0.2491 0.3503 0.3769 0.2545 0.3727 0.2468 0.2131 0.1183 
134 CONGO 0.2717 0.3158 0.2275 0.3238 0.3052 0.3193 0.3197 0.1727 0.2513 0.1156 
135 SUDAN 0.2583 0.3268 0.1898 0.3484 0.3383 0.2867 0.4298 
 
0.0272 0.0185 
136 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.2293 0.2133 0.2452 0.1606 0.2019 0.2912 0.1842 0.2696 0.4704 0.2799 
137 CUBA 0.2129 0.1895 0.2363 0.3004 0.1660 0.0850 0.0576 
 
0.4806 0.0247 
138 IRAQ 0.1511 0.1747 0.1274 0.1715 0.2093 0.1357 0.3600 0.0000 0.0388 0.0288 
139 MYANMAR 0.1331 0.0830 0.1832 0.1148 0.0775 0.0515 0.1667 0.2408 
 
0.1170 
140 KOREA, NORTH 0.0770 0.0578 0.0962 0.1082 0.0379 0.0216 0.0000 
 
0.0103 0.0000 
141 SOMALIA 0.0563 0.0976 0.0150 0.0748 0.0174 0.2247 0.0298 
 
0.0254 0.0000 
 
 
36 
 
  
Figure 2 
Comparison with other indices 
 
 
a. Bertelsman Transformation Index 
 
b. Economic Freedom of the World (Frazer) 
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c. Index of Economic Freedom  (Heritage) 
 
d. Global Competitive Index 
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e. Global Integrity Index 
 
f. Euromoney 
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g. World Audit 
 
 
 
 
